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We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and the British Household Panel Survey 
to estimate the extent of intergenerational economic mobility in a framework that highlights 
the role played by assortative mating. We find that assortative mating plays an important role. 
On average about 40-50 percent of the covariance between parents’ and own permanent 
family income can be attributed to the person to whom one is married. This effect is driven by 
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this work.  Most of what we know about how socio-economic status is passed from one generation to the 
next comes from studies of fathers and sons, or, more rarely, fathers and daughters.
1 But those 
sons and daughters usually become someone’s spouse, and the way in which this matching 
occurs may have consequences for their own socio-economic position. Accordingly, how 
inequality evolves over generations depends on more than just one’s own labour income or 
human capital, it depends on who marries whom.  Thus, both parents and parents-in-law shape 
their offspring’s status. This paper’s main contribution is to estimate the extent to which 
assortative mating affects intergenerational economic mobility in Germany and Britain, 
following the suggestion by Chadwick and Solon (2002, p.343) that replication of their results 
using data from other countries would be particularly informative. The paper also makes a 
methodological contribution in demonstrating that retrospective information on father’s 
occupation, summarised in an “occupational prestige” score that is correlated with earnings, 
can be used to obtain estimates of intergenerational mobility that are comparable to those 
obtained from direct information on earnings.   
  For centuries and in several countries, marriage has been one of the primary 
institutions through which economic mobility and social stratification took place (Hamilton, 
1912; Goody, 1983). The development of a national marriage market in London and Bath in 
the second half of the eighteenth century greatly widened the pool of potentially satisfactory 
spouses from the point of view of upper-class parents, because it increased the number of 
potential spouses who would meet the necessary financial and social qualifications (Stone, 
1977).  Two centuries later, for a group of working-class families sampled in London between 
1943 and 1946, Slater and Woodside (1951) report high and significant correlation 
coefficients between husbands and wives on a number of characteristics, including age at 
                                                 
1 The majority of studies in this literature focus on fathers. See Solon (1999) for a detailed survey. Presumably 
the neglect of mothers has stemmed from the recognition that, in societies in which married women’s labour 
force participation rates are lower than men’s, women’s earnings (and incomes) are likely to be an unreliable 
measure of their status. Important exceptions are Thomas (1994), Couch and Dunn (1997), Dearden et al. (1997) 
and Chadwick and Solon (2002).  
  1marriage, stature, social background and pre-marital sex experience.
2  Thus, there is evidence 
of purposeful mating that is likely to affect the correlation between one’s own socio-economic 
position and that of their parents. 
One of the few economic studies that explicitly recognises the link between assortative 
mating and intergenerational mobility is that by Chadwick and Solon (2002), which further 
develops the earlier works by Lam and Schoeni (1993, 1994). Chadwick and Solon find that 
assortative mating plays a key role in the intergenerational transmission process in the United 
States.  In particular, “spouses’ earnings appear to be just as elastic as the offspring’s own 
earnings with respect to the parents’ income” (Chadwick and Solon, p. 343). Lam and Schoeni 
(1994) interpret the greater effect of father-in-law’s schooling than that of father’s schooling 
on the wages of male workers in Brazil as an indication of a high degree of assortative mating 
in the marriage market.
3 This paper is in a similar vein. It derives intergenerational links 
between own income and parents’ income and partner’s income and parents’ income using 
utility-maximising behaviour by parents in the spirit of the studies carried out by Becker and 
Tomes (1979, 1986), Loury (1981) and Mulligan (1999).
4  
We use two sources of data: the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The former has sufficient information on earnings 
of parents and their offspring to estimate our model using a standard earnings’ measure of 
economic status, and with these data we also replicate Chadwick and Solon’s approach for 
Germany. For Britain, we must use a non-standard measure of economic status based on an 
“occupational prestige” score, but because we also have a similar such measure for Germany 
                                                 
2 Epstein and Guttman (1984) provide a comprehensive overview of several (noneconomic) studies on 
assortative mating. For more recent analyses, see Mare (1991) and Kalmjin (1994). 
3 Using a sample of father-child pairs with fathers coming from the 1950 Rowntree inquiry in York (England) 
and children subsequently traced in the late 1970s, Atkinson et al. (1983) find that the elasticity of male earnings 
with respect to father-in-law’s earnings is similar to the elasticity of male earnings with respect to own father’s 
earnings. A similar result is found for Malaysia by Lillard and Kilburn (1995).  
4 For an interesting discussion on mechanical versus optimising models, see the exchange of opinions between 
Goldberger (1989) and Becker (1989). See also Mulligan (1999). 
 
 
  2we are able to compare the results with those using earnings. We present a measurement 
model that shows the conditions under which our estimates are consistent estimates of the 
parameters in our model. In the next section, we present a simple model that illustrates the 
potential importance of assortative mating in the intergenerational transmission of socio-
economic status. Section 2 presents our measurement model and assesses the main properties 
of our estimators. Section 3 describes the data, while Section 4 discusses our econometric 
methods. The empirical results in Section 5 show that assortative mating is an important 
element in the intergenerational transmission process, and its contribution is similar 
irrespective of economic status measure or country.  Section 6 concludes.  
  
1. Assortative mating and intergenerational links  
The framework motivating this study integrates assortative mating considerations into a 
simple model of human capital investments in children.  Besides their own consumption, 
 parents are assumed to care about the expected joint “permanent” income of their adult 
offspring, which is the expected sum of their child’s and his/her future partner’s permanent 
incomes, E[ ], where t indicates the generation, p indicates the partner and E[.] is the 
expectations operator.
, 1 − t C
p
t t y y +
5  As mentioned above, a considerable body of research has shown that 
there is systematic (or nonrandom) positive sorting of partners with respect to complementary 
characteristics, non-wage incomes and possibly wages (e.g., Becker, 1991; Lam, 1988; Lam 
and Schoeni, 1994). This leads us to specify the following matching function 




t v H H + + = 1 0 α α
which links own and potential partner’s “human capital”, denoted by   and   






                                                 
5 For convenience the terms “partner” and “spouse” (husband or wife) are synonymous here.  
 
  3selection, such as attractiveness and tastes (Kalmijn, 1994), whereas the parameter  1 α  
captures the degree of assortative mating with respect to human capital. Although assortative 
mating is in reality more complex than what equation (1) implies, this formulation is very 
similar to those adopted in Lam and Schoeni (1993, 1994) and Chadwick and Solon (2002). 
The difference is that those studies assume that marital sorting is with respect to earnings or 
incomes, while here it is on human capital.  
) 1
Individual permanent incomes are assumed to increase with human capital: 
(2)  t t t e H y + + = 1 01 γ γ  






t e H y + + = 2 02 γ γ
where  γ1 and γ2 are nonnegative parameters, and the stochastic terms et  and   are 
independent of one another and of v . These income equations allow the returns to human 





The parents’ consensus utility is given by U , 
with 
log( ) 1 ( ]) [ log( − − + + = t
p
t t C y y E π π
) 1 , 0 ( ∈ π  measuring the relative preference for child’s future family income as against 
parents’ own consumption. Parents choose  to maximise their utility subject to (1)-(3) and 
their budget constraint,  where p
t H
, 1 1 t H t t H p C y + = − − H is the relative unit price of child’s human 
capital.
6 The solution to this problem implies that the optimal level of child’s human capital is 
a linear function of parents’ income, with slope  . / H p π  Using this expression and (2), the 
income of the child becomes 
(4)  t t t u y y 1 1 1 0 + + = − β β , 
                                                 
6 Consensus parental utility entails that human capital investment depends on total family income,  it does 
not depend differentially on mothers’ and fathers’ incomes, as would be the case when outcomes emerge from 
intrafamily bargaining, and personal incomes affect bargaining power. 
; 1 − t y
 
  4where β1=πγ1/pH, and u1t is a stochastic term that depends on   e ,
p
t v t and   Using (1) and (3), 




(5)  ,  t t
p
t u y y 2 1 1 0 + + = − δ δ
where  δ1=α1πγ2/pH, and   is another stochastic term that depends on    e t u2 ,
p
t v t and   
Equations (4) and (5) form the basis of our empirical analysis, whose main focus is therefore 




1 β  and  1 δ .
7 From the definitions of such parameters in terms 
of their structural counterparts, it follows that  1 δ / 1 β =α1γ2/γ1.  If the income returns to human 
capital are the same for men and women (γ1=γ2), then the ratio  1 δ / 1 β  identifies α1, the degree 
of assortative mating on human capital in (1).  
Finally the model has implications for the relationship between child’s family  income, 
 and that of his/her parents, whereby   ,
p
t t y y +
(6)   cov( .  ) var( ) ( ) , cov( ) , cov( ) , 1 1 1 1 1 1 − − − − + = + = + t t
p
t t t t
p
t t y y y y y y y y δ β
The contribution that assortative mating makes to the intergenerational mobility process is 



















It is straightforward to see that µ decreases with  1 β  and increases with  1 δ , and (7) implies that 
] ) 1 /[( 2 1 1 γ µ µ γ α − =
1
. Clearly if the income returns to human capital are the same for men and 
women, then  ) 1 /( µ µ α − = . 
 
                                                 
7 Notice that equations (4) and (5) are similar to equations (1) and (3) in Chadwick and Solon (2002), but the 
relationship between the two slope parameters is different—see their equations (2) and (4). 
 
 
  52. Measurement issues  
Estimation of the reduced-form parameters  1 β  and  1 δ  requires data that provide information 
on the socio-economic position of individuals, their partners and their parents. One of two 
data sources is the first nine waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) collected 
annually over the period 1991-1999. At present the panel is too short to relate the children’s 
income as adults to the income of their parents as annually reported by the children and 
parents themselves. Fortunately, the BHPS asks respondents to provide information about 
their parents’ occupations when they were aged 14, and releases data on an index of 
occupational prestige computed according to the technique proposed by Goldthorpe and Hope 
(1974).
8 Matching partners in all available waves provides us with information for each 
partner’s Hope-Goldthorpe (HG) scores and childhood information (at age 14) about parents’ 
HG scores.
9 The HG index ranges from 5 to 95 (and from 17 to 85 in our data), with greater 
values indicating higher occupational prestige, and it is highly correlated with earnings.
10 The 
BHPS data indicate a correlation between gross monthly earnings and the HG index of 0.70 
for men and 0.75 for women. In addition, because the position of individuals in the 
occupational hierarchy is relatively stable over time, the HG scale is also likely to be an 
adequate measure of people’s permanent socio-economic status (Nickell, 1982).
11   
                                                 
8 Goldthorpe and Hope (1974) suggest that the scale which results from their occupational prestige grading 
exercise should not be viewed as a grading of social status stricto sensu, i.e., as tapping some underlying 
structure of social relations of “deference, acceptance and derogation” (p. 10). It should instead be viewed as “a 
judgement which is indicative of what might be called the ‘general goodness’ or … the ‘general desirability’ of 
occupations” (pp. 11-12).  
9 The information on parents’ occupation was collected only in waves 1, 8 and 9 (1991, 1998 and 1999 
respectively). 
10 Phelps Brown (1977) reports a strong log-linear relationship between median gross weekly earnings and the 
HG score, with a rise of 1 unit in the index being associated with an increase of 1.031 percent in earnings. 
Nickell (1982) finds a correlation between the HG score and the average hourly earnings of 0.85.  
11 To support this claim, we used the employment history file collected in the 1993 wave of the BHPS and 
obtained a measure of the HG scores at the time of permanent entry into the labour market for all respondents 
who provided full information at that wave. We then observed the HG scores for workers at the end of their 
careers (ages 56-65 for men and ages 55-60 for women) during the survey period (1991-99). We found that the 
correlation between an individual’s position in the occupational hierarchy (as measured by the HG index) on 
entry into the labour market and at end of the working career was almost 0.60 for men and 0.62 for women, 
respectively, even after controlling for a large set of socio-demographic characteristics. Averaging the HG scores 
over age for each older worker produced similar, albeit slightly smaller, correlations.  
 
  6The other source of data is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) over the period 
1984-2002. Like the BHPS, the SOEP too provides information on respondents’ father’s 
occupation when they were aged 15, and publishes an index of occupational prestige 
computed according to the technique proposed by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996). The 
Treiman standard international occupational prestige   score varies from 13 to 78.  Like the HG 
scale, larger values indicate higher occupational prestige, and it is highly correlated with 
earnings, although not as high as the HG scores in Britain; the correlation with gross monthly 
earnings in the SOEP is 0.39 for men and 0.43 for women. 
To see how the permanent incomes of our theoretical model of Section 1 are related to 
the HG and Treiman indices, denoted  , we now specify a simple “measurement model”. 
Suppose that the parents’ permanent income, y
t M
, 1 −
t-1, is a linear function of the father’s index 
when the child was aged 14 (or 15), as follows: t M
12 
(8) . 1 1 1 0 1 − − − + + = t t t M a a y ε  
The child generation’s permanent income is similarly defined as  




t M b b y ε + + =
where j = m, f denotes male and female children respectively. The stochastic terms εt-1 and εtj 




                                                 
12 In the model of Section 1, parents’ decisions depend on the permanent income of the family (rather than that of 
the father). However, aggregating mother’s and father’s HG or Treiman scores will not yield a meaningful 
measure of family social status. We therefore chose to use the father’s HG or Treiman index as a first 
approximation of parents’ permanent income.  
13 The independence of εt-1 and εtj may be a strong assumption if there is correlation in other factors affecting 
permanent income that are correlated between parents and their offspring. We address this possibility below. 
 
  7If for instance we look at sons, the estimates of β1 and δ1 from the HG and Treiman 
scale data are, respectively, 
) var(











β  and 
) var(
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δ δ . 
Thus, in general, we do not obtain consistent estimates of the reduced-form parameters β1 and 
δ1. Whether or not they are biased downward, as in the classical measurement error model, 
depends on the magnitude of var(εt-1) and on the ratio a1/b1j. If this ratio is less than unity, 
they are certainly biased downward; if instead it is greater than one, then   and   may be 
biased upward or downward. But our estimate of 





















m f b b
p  
If the measurement links between permanent income and the Mt index are the same for men 
and women  , then we obtain a consistent estimate of µ.  Suppose, however, that the 
measurement errors for parents and sons are positively correlated, that is 
) ( 1 1 f m b b =
, 0 ) , cov( 1 > − tm t ε ε  
and let ϕ  define  ). var( / ) , 1 1 − − t tm t y cov( ε ε  This implies that the denominator of equation (12) 
also contains an additional term, ( , ) / 1 1 ϕ m f b b  and our estimate of µ tends to be downward 
biased. Finally, if the income returns to human capital are the same for men and women 




















1 − t M
.  Thus, α1 is also identified under these 
conditions if    . 1 1 f m b b =
j
t M
                                                
There are, however, three further measurement problems with the occupational 
prestige measure: (a) we only have one observation on M (when the child was aged 14 or 
15); (b) the data on parents are obtained from adult children, and not from the parents 
themselves; and (c) a misclassification error may arise when a new occupation is observed or 
an old occupation disappears.
1 − t
14 By diminishing the signal proportion of the sample variation 
in measured M scores, these problems are likely to induce another downward error-in-
variables bias in the estimates of both β1 and δ1, in addition to the inconsistency suggested by 
equations (10) and (11). But to the extent that such a bias affects both parameters similarly, 
the estimation of their ratio as well as µ  which are key to our empirical analysis  may be 
less problematic.  
Most importantly, the German SOEP data also provide another, more standard, way to 
estimate our model. In this case,   represents the father’s average gross monthly labour 
income, and   is the labour income of the child.
15 Thus, the same sort of measurement 
issues arise, although some of the key determinants of bias, such as the ratios a1/b1j and b1m/b1f 




14 Goldthorpe and Hope (1974) do not consider this issue explicitly. However, they describe (see their chapter 6) 
some of the problems that are relevant in collecting and coding occupational data, which in turn are of some 
importance to apply their scale. In particular, “uncertainty arising from incomplete occupation descriptions can 
be resolved only by the invention of ad hoc rules” (p. 69) over and above those already embodied in the HG 
scale. To the extent that such measures are used, the new HG scale therefore may not be expected to reflect the 
occupational prestige that it originally intended to capture. The emergence (disappearing) of a new (old) 
occupation can presumably generate the same sort of uncertainty. 
15 Children’s incomes are measured in the last survey period when we observe positive labour income. In the 
case of women we also restrict the sample to those in full-time employment (see subsection 3.2).  
  93.1 The BHPS sample
16 
For Britain, we perform our estimation on 2,046 daughters and 2,151 sons who have valid 
information on their own, their father’s and partner’s HG scores.  In Figure 1 we plot the HG 
index distributions for fathers, fathers-in-law and sons (panel A), or daughters (panel B). The 
child distributions are bimodal, but more clearly so in the case of daughters. The spike on the 
left (which corresponds to lower prestige) is also more pronounced for daughters. This 
suggests that women are more concentrated in low-prestige occupations and can be found in 
fewer occupations than men. The figure shows a mean displacement, in that the distributions 
for fathers and fathers-in-law are skewed to the right while the child distributions are bimodal, 
or (as in the case of sons) even skewed to the left (the skewness coefficient is about –0.043). 
This displacement is associated with an increase in average prestige over time as well as with 
higher status dispersion (means and standard deviations are reported in Table 1). So the HG 
index distribution is not stable across generations and, in particular, low-prestige occupations 
that characterised the fathers’ distribution have increasingly disappeared from the child 
distributions.  
 
3.2 The German SOEP samples
17 
For Germany, we use two different samples. The first, which is similar to that drawn from the 
BHPS, consists of children for whom we have valid information on their father’s, their 
partner’s as well as their own Treiman scores. This sample includes 2,213 daughters and 
2,670 sons. Figure 2 depicts the Treiman index distributions for fathers, fathers-in-law and 
sons (panel A), or daughters (panel B). As in the case of Britain, the child distributions are 
bimodal, although  differently from Britain  most of the distributions are concentrated in 
                                                 
16 Detailed information about the BHPS is at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps/docs.  




  10the centre. A smaller spike for daughters is observed at the bottom end of the distribution, 
while for sons it is observed at the top end, suggesting again that more women than men are 
concentrated in low-prestige occupations. The Treiman score distributions for fathers and 
fathers-in-law are similar in both panels. In line with the results for Britain, the figures show a 
mean displacement across generations, so that the density at higher scores is more pronounced 
for children in comparison to their fathers and fathers-in-law. For sons, this is particular true 
for Treiman scores above 50, whereas for daughters it is the case for scores between 45 and 
60. Table 1 (upper panel) shows that this displacement is associated with both an increased 
average level and an increased dispersion in occupational prestige across generations in 
Germany.  
The second sample consists of 242 daughters and 537 sons from original SOEP 
households who have cohabitated with their partners at least one year during the panel years. 
We restrict the analysis to a cohort of children born between 1962 and 1977 for whom we 
have information about their own, their fathers’ as well as their partners’ monthly labour 
earnings. Children’s and their partners’ earnings are observed at ages of at least 25 and are 
measured in the last survey period we observe positive values. Income data at younger ages 
would provide noisy information on long-run economic status (for a similar sample selection, 
see Chadwick and Solon, 2002). Father’s self-reported earnings are ten-year averages over the 
1984-1993 period to reduce the bias induced by transitory income fluctuations on the 
intergenerational elasticities (Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992).
18 Daughters’ and son’s 
partners’ incomes are full-time earnings.
19 Summary statistics of this sample are in the bottom 
panel of Table 1.  
                                                 
18 Yearly observations for which earnings are non-positive or missing are excluded from the analysis. Additional 
analyses based on father’s earnings averaged over different years (e.g., 1984-1989) produced similar results to 
those reported in Section 5. Similarly, different restrictions on the year of birth of the child led to comparable 
estimates to those discussed later on. For conciseness, these results are not shown.   
19 This selection guarantees a cleaner comparison between women and men. In addition, part-time earnings for 
the young women in our sample are likely to be noisy measures of permanent economic status.  
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4. Statistical methods 
When using the occupational prestige indices, the estimators  and   are equivalent to 
substituting the scale data for permanent incomes in equations (4) and (5) and estimating them 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. To align the age-status profiles across 
generations, age and age squared of the child, or child’s partner, are also included as 
regressors in the estimation. Table 1 indicates that the sample mean age is about 40 for sons 
and 38-39 for daughters. However, father’s age is not available in the BHPS, so it cannot be 
included.
1 ˆ β 1 ˆ δ
20  
As illustrated in (10) and (11) and discussed above, the OLS estimates of β1 and δ1 are 
biased because of errors-in-variables (as captured by var(εt-1)) and because of potentially 
different links between permanent income and prestige scores for fathers and children (as 
captured by the ratio a1/b1j). Like many other studies of intergenerational mobility, we try to 
reduce the errors-in-variables bias by measuring child’s permanent income with a multiyear 
average of the child prestige index over the survey period (denoted by  t M  and  p
t M ). That is, 
in place of equation (9), we have:  




t M b b y ε + + =   
where   We expect  . , f m j = ) var( ) var( tj tj ε ε < . Re-writing (4) as   





1 1 0 1
− −
− + + − = β β β t t t y u y











= β , and 
                                                 
20 In the SOEP, however, respondents report the date of birth of their parents. We can therefore include father’s 
age and age squared in our regressions. The results obtained from such regressions are virtually identical to those 
reported in Table 3. To keep comparability with the BHPS analysis, however, the next section only shows 
estimates that exclude father’s age.  
 











= δ . Then, using the measurement model in equations (8) and 
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Since 
) var( ) var(











>1, the reverse regression estimator   tends to be biased 
upwards, even if the ratio a
R
1 ˆ β
1/b1m is unity. But the bias will be smaller if  ) var( tm ε  is smaller, 
and if   is smaller. Similar arguments apply to  . Note that the measurement 
error in  which we cannot reduce by taking multiyear averages, does not affect these 
estimators. 
) var( / ) var( 1
m
t t y u
, 1 − t M
R
1 ˆ δ
The augmented OLS regressions that produce multivariate estimators analogous to   
and   include multiyear averages of child’s age and age squared and multiyear averages of 






1/b1j are unity, then the OLS and OLS-reverse estimates should produce lower and upper 
bound estimates of β1 (δ1), respectively. In contrast to the consistent estimate of µ based on 
the OLS estimates when  the estimate of µ based on the OLS-reverse estimates is 
only consistent under special conditions. In fact, in addition to 
, 1 1 f m b b =
































.   
We may over- or under-estimate the true value of µ  using the OLS estimates, 
depending on how the links between permanent income and prestige scores differ between 
  13partners. To assess the severity of this problem, we estimate an approximation to equation (9) 
separately for husbands and wives and under two alternative specifications. The first 
specification uses contemporaneous total personal income or earnings and scores, and the 
second uses their corresponding multiyear averages. The results, which are robust to the 
inclusion of quadratic polynomials in age in both specifications, are shown in Table 2. The 
estimated ratio   is not significantly different from unity for Britain when we use 
annual incomes, although it slightly exceeds unity when we use earnings. This suggests that 
the OLS estimates are likely to yield consistent estimates of µ for Britain. But for Germany, 
this ratio is well in excess of one, thereby suggesting that the estimate of µ for Germany is 
upward-biased.  
f m b b 1 1 /
Table 2 also presents the least-squares estimates of a1 from equation (8). Because we 
do not have information on parents’ or fathers’ incomes in the BHPS, such estimates have 
been obtained from a subsample of working fathers who report valid information on incomes 
and occupation (and therefore HG scores) and were born before 1950.
21 Both regressions 
show that the estimated ratios a1/b1m and a1/b1f are close to one when we use annual incomes, 
but slightly larger than one when we use monthly earnings.  This suggests that the bias in the 
estimates of β1 and δ1 due to different links between incomes and HG scores of parents and 
offspring may be small for Britain.  This implies that the OLS estimates are biased downward 
and the OLS-reverse estimates are biased upward (see equations (10) and (11) and (14) and 
(15), respectively).  For Germany, a1/b1m is close to unity, but a1/b1f is well in excess of one. 
The latter suggests that the OLS estimate of δ1 for sons (β1 for daughters) may be biased-
upward, counteracting the measurement error bias.   
An important, often ignored, issue for the estimation of intergenerational mobility 
parameters is that labour market participation decisions are not random, especially in the case 
                                                 
21 Similar results for Britain were found for a sample of working fathers born between 1940 and 1960. 
  14of women.
22 For daughters, we account for this sample selection issue using the 
semiparametric two-step procedure described in Vella (1998), which is based on standard 
exclusion restrictions.
23 Although the selectivity correction terms are in general statistically 
significant, our main results in both countries do not change if such terms are excluded from 
the analysis.  
 
5. Results 
Table 3 contains the OLS and OLS-reverse estimates of β1 and δ1 for sons and daughters 
separately. The OLS estimate of β1 is 0.31 for sons and 0.26 for daughters in Britain, and 
similar at 0.33 and 0.25 for Germany (first two columns of Table 3). The estimate of δ1 is 
lower in both countries: about 0.20 for both sexes in Britain, and 0.26 and 0.20 for male and 
female partners respectively in Germany. As already discussed, these estimates are probably 
biased downwards.
24 As expected, the OLS-reverse method (shown in the last two columns of 
Table 3) produces much higher values in Britain, rising to 0.44 and 0.40 in the case of β1 and 
to 0.29 and 0.27 in the case of δ1.
25  In Germany, the OLS-reverse estimates are similar to the 
OLS ones.   
                                                 
22 Common practice in most of the existing studies has been to exclude all records of data where parents or 
children report no earnings or income (because, for example, they were unemployed at the time of the survey). 
Two exceptions are the studies by Couch and Lillard (1998) and Minicozzi (2003). Both studies, which 
interestingly consider only men, conclude that there exists an important role for assumptions on labour market 
selection in identifying intergenerational income mobility, but their evidence is mixed. Couch and Lillard assign 
one dollar of income to individuals who have a valid report of no earnings, and find that more selected samples 
lead to higher intergenerational correlations between sons’ and fathers’ incomes. Minicozzi uses another method 
and estimates different Manski-type bounds around sons’ income. Contrary to Couch and Lillard, she finds that 
dropping both unemployed and part-time employed sons leads to a higher degree of mobility than if part-time 
employed sons had been included. 
23 In particular, all regressions for daughters include a cubic polynomial of the single index function that 
determines the selection into employment. The variables included in this selection equation are listed in the note 
to Table 3. 
24 Interestingly, in spite of the fact that we use a different measure of status, our OLS estimates of β1 are close to 
(and perhaps higher than) those shown in Atkinson et al. (1983)  when they use net family income as their 
variable of interest  and to those reported in Blanden et al. (2003), where the log of children’s earnings are 
regressed on the log of parental income. However in contrast to Atkinson et al. (1983) for Britain, our estimates 
of δ1 are always smaller than those of β1. 
25 Given the estimates of the a1/ b1j ratios of about unity in Table 2, the two sets of estimates are likely to be 
lower and upper bounds, respectively, for Britain.   
 
  15For Germany, we also have estimates based on average earnings. Compared to the 
estimates based on occupational prestige scores, these provide higher estimates of both β1 and 
δ1 for sons (about 0.4 and 0.33 respectively), and lower ones for daughters (around 0.15 for 
both parameters). Our β1 estimates for sons are comparable to those reported by Couch and 
Dunn (1997, see their Table 2 and discussion in p. 220). Instead, we cannot compare our 
estimates for daughters to those presented in Couch and Dunn (1997), because they use 
mother-daughter pairs rather than father-daughter pairs. Our estimates however are 
substantially greater than theirs, which are typically negative. In addition to our use of father-
daughter pairs, this difference may also be driven by our selection on full-time female 
workers.   
The OLS-reverse β1 estimates for British sons and the earnings-based β1 estimates for 
German sons are close to the 0.4 “consensus” estimates found in the recent literature on sons’ 
intergenerational earnings mobility (Solon, 1999). The British OLS-reverse estimates for 
daughters are also close to the 0.4 mark and are comparable to those found by Chadwick and 
Solon (2002). The German estimates for daughters are instead lower, especially those based 
on earnings. This may be due to occupational segregation which restricts German women to 
occupations with relatively lower levels of prestige and earnings in comparison to men 
(Rubery et al., 1999). It may also be due to the fact that the women in the earnings-based 
sample are young (on average, 8 years younger than those in the score-based sample) and, 
despite our selection on full-timers, their earnings may not be a good measure of long-run 
economic status because of the sizeable wage penalties associated with child births and early 
career interruptions (Kunze and Ejrnaes, 2004). 
One of the main goals of our study is to use these estimates to explore the role of 
assortative mating in intergenerational mobility of married sons and daughters.  The estimated 
values of  reported in Table 2 strongly suggest that our estimate of µ from the OLS  f m b b 1 1 /
  16estimates should be consistent for Britain. In fact the implied values of µ in Table 3 are stable 
across estimation procedures, suggesting that the component of intergenerational mobility that 
is attributable to assortative mating may be fairly confidently estimated regardless of the 
method used for estimating the 1 β  and  1 δ  parameters. The estimated value of µ is 0.39 for 
men and varies between 0.40 and 0.43 for women.  For Germany, there is also consensus 
across estimation procedures, including the one using average earnings. The estimated value 
of µ for German sons and daughters ranges between 0.43 and 0.50. Because the values of 
 in Table 2 are significantly greater than unity for Germany, our corresponding 
estimates of µ might be biased upward. 
f m b b 1 1 /
2 γ
1 α
For both men and women in both countries, therefore, 40-50 percent of the covariance 
between their own permanent family income and that of their parents can be attributed to 
sorting in the marriage market. As indicated by their (bootstrap) standard errors, these 
proportions are usually precisely estimated, although less so when using average earnings for 
Germany, in part due to smaller samples. With 40-50 percent of one’s social position 
attributable to the process of who marries whom, assortative mating appears to be a major 
factor in the intergenerational transmission of economic status.  
Under the assumption that  , 1 γ =  we can also retrieve the degree of assortative 
mating with respect to human capital,  . Table 3 shows that in Britain  1 ˆ α  is about 0.65 for 
sons and varies between 0.68 and 0.76 for daughters. The estimates are higher in Germany, 
but not very precisely estimated when using average earnings (especially in the case of 
daughters). Our model uses a broad concept of (unobservable) human capital. The British 
estimates, especially those for sons, are very close to the estimates in Kremer (1997), who 
reports that the spouse correlations in years of education are between 0.62 and 0.65. The 
figures for Germany and for British daughters, instead, seem high relative to the available 
estimates that document the process of assortative mating (Epstein and Guttman, 1984), 
  17although none of these estimates is based on one broad measure of human capital. For 
Germany, the estimates of  1 α , which are likely to be upward biased (as indicated by the 
values of b  in Table 2), could also reflect the fact that the school system selects pupils 
into distinct, highly separated educational tracks very early on in life (Jenkins and Schluter, 
2002). This in turn may affect the pool of potential spouses that people meet and drive up the 
educational correlation between partners (Mare, 1991).
f m b1 1 /
26  
Another approach to the issue of gauging the role of assortative mating in the 
transmission of economic status across generations was taken by Chadwick and Solon (2002). 
We can use this approach only for Germany. We replicate their study, and come to the same 
conclusion regarding the importance of assortative mating that they came to for the United 
States. The results are provided in Table 4 (the summary statistics for this sample are reported 
in Appendix Table A1).
27  The estimate of the elasticity of offspring’s own earnings with 
respect to the parents’ income for daughters is about half the size of that found by Chadwick 
and Solon, and the estimated elasticity for sons is about one-third the size.  But, similar to 
them, the statistically insignificant coefficients associated with the log of the partner’s share 
of combined earnings in Table 4 indicate that the elasticity of spouses’ earnings with respect 
to the parents’ income is not significantly different from the elasticity of offspring’s own 
earnings with respect to the parents’ income.  Thus, assortative mating plays a crucial role in 
intergenerational economic mobility.   
                                                 
26 Although years of education and earnings do not straightforwardly correspond to the concepts of human 
capital and permanent income in the context of the model of Section 1, several empirical studies provide 
evidence of wage returns to education that are larger for women than for men both in Germany and in Britain 
(Lauer and Steiner, 2000; Harmon et al., 2001; Walker and Zhu, 2001). If this is the case also among partners, 
such results imply that our estimates of α for daughters should increase by about 25 percent in both countries. 
27 Due to data availability, our sample selection differs from that used by Chadwick and Solon (2002) in a 
number of ways. In particular, our sample consists of a younger cohort of children who were born between 1962 
and 1977. In our analysis, children’s earnings are measured in the last survey period we observe positive values 
(rather than one specific year of the survey). Moreover, father’s labour earnings are ten-year averages over the 
years 1984-1993 (although most of our results hold if we average over a shorter time period). To maximise 
sample size, our analysis includes all children present in a household rather than the oldest siblings (again, 
retaining only the oldest siblings does not change our main findings) as well as all cases with imputed earnings. 
Finally, as in the previous analysis, we only include daughters in full-time employment. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper makes two contributions to the intergenerational mobility literature. The first is to 
estimate economic mobility for sons and daughters in a framework that highlights the role 
played by assortative mating. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey and the 
German Socio-Economic Panel, we find that assortative mating plays an important role. On 
average about 40-50 percent of the covariance between parents’ and own family permanent 
income can be attributed to assortative mating. This effect is driven by strong spouse 
correlations in human capital. 
On the methodological front, we find that using occupational prestige scores of fathers 
and offspring as a predictor of permanent income produces similar results to those using 
average earnings data in Germany. Therefore, this method can be employed in countries or 
datasets that do not have sufficient information on earnings of parents and their offspring, 
because household surveys often collect information on a respondent’s father’s occupation 
(but not earnings).   
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Figure 1  
Kernel density estimates of the child, father and father-in-law’s HG scores distributions by 












































































  23Figure 2 
Kernel density estimates of the child, father and father-in-law’s Treiman scores distributions 
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  24Table 1 
Descriptive statistics  
 
 BHPS    SOEP 
Variable Sons  Daughters    Sons  Daughters 
        

































Number of person-wave 
observations 
12,357 10,646  9,657  7,012 
Number of individuals  2,151  2,046  2,670  2,213 
        
        
Earnings:        
Child 
 

















Age:        
Child 
 

















  Number of individuals      537   242  
  Number of partners       221  541 
        
Note: In the upper panel, figures are means (standard deviations) computed on the number of person-wave 
observations. In the lower panel, figures are computed on the number of children and their partners. Scores are the 
Hope-Goldthorpe score for the BHPS and the Treiman score for the SOEP. Earnings are gross monthly earnings 
deflated using the Consumer Price Index and are expressed in 2001 Euros. Earnings for women are full-time earnings. 
Children’s and their partners’ earnings are measured in the last year we observe positive earnings in the SOEP.  




  25Table 2 
The relationships between scores and incomes and earnings for sons and daughters and 
between scores and family income and earnings for fathers  Estimates of b1m, b1f, and a1 and 
their ratios 
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Note: The figures for the b and a coefficients are in constant (1999) pounds in the BHPS and in constant (2001) 
Euros in the SOEP. Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors, which are robust to arbitrary form of 
heteroskedasticity in the case of the “levels” specifications. Numbers in square brackets are bootstrap standard 
errors, which have been computed after 1,000 replications. Earnings are gross monthly earnings deflated using 
the Consumer Price Index and are expressed in 1999 Pounds and 2001 Euros. 
  26Table 3 
Estimated intergenerational coefficients, assortative mating contributions, and degree of 
assortative mating for sons and daughters in the BHPS and the SOEP 
 
 OLS  OLS-reverse 
 Sons  Daughters  Sons  Daughters 
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Number of observations  12,357  10,646  2,151  2,046 
          
SOEP          









































Number of observations  9,657  7,012  2,670  2,213 
        
SOEP        





























Number of individuals  537   242     
Number of partners  221  541     
        
  27Note: Numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors. In the OLS regressions, standard errors are Huber-
White corrected for the potential correlation in the disturbances across observations. Numbers in square brackets 
are bootstrap standard errors, which have been computed after 1,000 replications. The OLS regressions include 
age and age-squared. The OLS-reverse regressions include the averages of child’s age and age squared. For 
daughters, all regressions are selectivity corrected with a cubic polynomial of the index function from the 
selection equation. For the BHPS sample, the (probit) equation contains: age, number of dependent children by 
age groups (five age groups: 0-2, 3-4, 5-11, 12-15, 16-18), and dummy variables for race (4 variables), highest 
educational achievement (5), marital status, year of first partnership (3), and region (16).  For the SOEP sample, 
the (probit) equation contains: age, number of dependent children by age groups (five age groups: 0-1, 2-4, 5-10, 
11-15, 16-18), dummy variable for nationality, highest educational achievement (6), marital status and federal 




  28 
 
Table 4 


















      
Sons      












Log of partner’s 
earnings 
   0.048 
(0.104) 
Log of partner’s share of 
combined  earnings 
   -0.100 
(0.085) 
Number of observations  719  713  487 
      
Daughters      














Log of partner’s 
earnings 
   0.201 
(0.043) 
Log of partner’s share of 
combined  earnings 
   0.003 
(0.029) 
Number of observations  630  624  606 
      
Note: Coefficients refer to the log income of the household of origin of the child. Child’s income and earnings 
variables are measured in the last year they are observed in the panel.  
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Table A1 









    




































Number of individuals  487  606 
    
Note: Figures are means (standard deviations) computed on the number of persons.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 